Arabi Facts Hub is a nonprofit organization dedicated to research mis/disinformation in the Arabic content on the Internet and provide innovative solutions to detect and identify it.

The "Terrorist" PMF vs. “Iran, the Solid Support”: An Analysis of Two Opposing Online Campaigns and their Reach in the Millions

The "Terrorist" PMF vs. “Iran, the Solid Support”: An Analysis of Two Opposing Online Campaigns and their Reach in the Millions

 

Following the launch of the first American-Israeli strike on Iran on Feb 28, 2026, and the subsequent official confirmation of Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei's death in the bombardment, Baghdad witnessed a surge of Iraqi protests. These demonstrations, concentrated within the Green Zone near the U.S. Embassy, ultimately escalated into confrontations with security personnel.

 

Coinciding with these clashes, the hashtag #الحشد_الشعبي_الإرهابي (The Popular Mobilization Forces [PMF] Are Terrorists) appeared for the first time on X on an Iraqi account named "Iraqi warriors @sx200s14," which identified itself as an Iraqi hostile to the Iranian regime's influence in Iraq. An examination of the account's transparency feature on the platform revealed that it is active from Australia.

 

Minutes later, the hashtag began to spread across several other Iraqi accounts that used the same hashtag: #الحشد_الشعبي_الإرهابي (The PMF Are Terrorists), along with other hashtags such as: #هلاك_خامنئي_المجرم (The Perishing of the Criminal Khamenei), #الحشد_منظمة_إرهابية (The PMF is a Terrorist Organization), and others, whose publication was led by accounts active from outside Iraq. In contrast, other Iraqi accounts supporting Iran used the hashtag #إيران_هي_السند_الحقيقي (Iran is the Solid Support), and were supported by Yemeni accounts that showed support from the Houthis for Iran.

 

 A little less than 3000 tweets reached millions of views

The hashtags appeared on March 1st and continued to spread throughout the month, reaching their peak on March 26th, with a total number of posts reaching 3,100. However, this limited number of posts achieved significant reach, with a total estimated at 122.5 million times, according to BrandMention data.

 



Most of these posts were published on X at a rate of approximately 78%, while a smaller number were published on Facebook at approximately 11% of the total posts, followed by Instagram at approximately 10%, according to the tool.

 

Most of the tweets were published in Arabic, with some presence of English and Persian, as the total percentage of posts written in those languages did not exceed 1% of the total number of posts.

These statistics were reflected in the list of hashtags associated with the posts, and in the cloud of the most present words. The hashtags #العراق (Iraq) and #إيران (Iran) topped the list of hashtags, followed by other hashtags related to the war, such as: #الحرب_على_إيران (The War on Iran), #حزب_الله_الارهابي (Hezbollah Are Terrorists) and #العدوان_الإيراني_الغاشم (Brutal Iranian Aggression).

 

In the word cloud of the most present terms, the phrase "Popular Mobilization Forces" emerged at the top, followed by "Revolutionary Guard," "Al-Jahsh al-Sha'bi," (Jackass PMF) and "Terrorist PMF." This indicates a clear focus on stigmatizing the "Popular Mobilization Forces" as terrorists and linking them to Iran.

 

Most active accounts are based outside Iraq

Analyses by Arabi Facts Hub using BrandMention revealed that many of the accounts most frequently posting the hashtags were active from outside Iraq. In the list of top posting accounts, the account " Ahmed ali الحساب البديل @ahmedail7777" (Ahmed Ali the Alternative Account) came first, posting 169 posts, all of which included the hashtag #الحشد_الشعبي_الإرهابي (The PMF Are Terrorists).

 

While labeling itself an "alternative account," the profile failed to link back to an original account, instead describing the user as an "engineer interested in political and military affairs." Despite claiming an Iraqi location, this 2024 account was revealed by transparency data to be operating from the West Asia region.

The account consistently focuses on the UAE in a large number of its posts, in addition to publishing content that includes support and promotion of its roles and decisions.

Coming in second, according to an analysis by Arabi Facts Hub, was the Iraqi Events account on Facebook, which published 152 posts. It is a news page dedicated to publishing news about Iraq and specified its location as Iraq, but an examination of its accounts on other platforms showed that it is active from outside the country; its transparency feature on X revealed that it operates from Europe.

As for the "Iraqi Events" account on Instagram, which published 125 posts and changed its name four times, it was found to be active from Finland.

Next on the list was the account "ME Sasuke @mobiledeath88," which published 121 posts. It is a relatively new account, created in 2021, and does not use a real name or photo. It identified its location as Washington, which is consistent with transparency data showing its activity from the United States.

As for the "MIGA @iraqarablove" account, which published 83 posts, all in the form of comments, it appears to be the only Iraqi account on the list. However, it exhibits several characteristics of inauthentic accounts; it is recently created, does not use a real name or photo, and all of its posts come in the form of identical comments at short time intervals.

 

“Iran is the Solid Support” — a counter campaign

On March 2nd, the third day of the American-Israeli war on Iran, and one day after the announcement of the assassination of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and several Iranian political and military figures, another hashtag supporting Iran appeared on X: #مع_إيران_حتى_النصر (With Iran Until Victory), in response to the hashtag #الحشد_الشعبي_الارهابي (The PMF Are Terrorists).

 

According to an analysis by Arabi Facts Hub, the hashtag “With Iran Until Victory” appeared for the first time on March 2nd, by an account named "Sadiq al-Askari @Sadiqalaskari89," which is an Iraqi account. The cover photo, which features Qasem Soleimani, in addition to the account's content, indicates that it is pro-Iranian.


 

Following that, the hashtag spread across several accounts, and the number of posts gradually increased, reaching its first peak on March 12. Despite this, the reach/spread level remained relatively low until a significant increase occurred on March 25, the day another hashtag appeared, “Iran is the Solid Support,” according to a BrandMention analysis.


The total number of posts associated with the two hashtags: “With Iran to Victory” and “Iran is the Solid Support” reached only about 275 posts, while the total reach/spread was about 12 million times, which indicates the possibility of an exaggeration in reach compared to the number of posts.

These posts also achieved an estimated 113,000 interactions, distributed across various platforms; approximately 47% of them were published on Instagram, followed by 38% on X, and then Facebook with approximately 6%.

The tool shows that all of these posts are in Arabic, despite being pro-Iranian, unlike the other campaign which saw a limited presence of English and Persian.






Peak Interaction and Associated Hashtags

Interaction with the two hashtags peaked on March 25th, the day the hashtag “Iran is the Solid Support” appeared, with a total estimated at about 98,000 interactions in a single day.

 

These posts were associated with several other hashtags, most notably #العراق (Iraq) and #السيد_علي_خامنئي (Sayyid Ali Khamenei), which saw protesters taking to the streets in Baghdad following the announcement of his assassination, along with hashtags of a mobilizing or mournful nature, such as: #تشييع_القائد (Funeral of the Leader), and #إمام_شهداء_القدس (Imam of the Martyrs of Jerusalem).

Other hashtags related to the Popular Mobilization Forces also appeared, which the counter-digital campaign focused on, such as the hashtags #الحشد_الشعبي (The Popular Mobilization Forces), #حملة_إنا_على_العهد (We are True to the Covenant), and #شيعة_علي (Shiites of Ali); this was reflected in the word cloud, where the words "Iraq" and "Popular Mobilization Forces" emerged as the most frequent, followed by: "Sayyid Ali Khamenei," then "the Islamic Republic," and then: "Tel Aviv."

 



The Most Active Accounts Included Iraqi and Yemeni Profiles

In contrast to the campaign targeting the PMF, which was led by accounts mostly active from outside Iraq, data showed that a number of accounts participating in the pro-Iran campaign are active from within Iraq, along with accounts from other countries, including Yemen.

 




At the top of the list of most active accounts was "Sadiq al-Askari @Sadiqalaskari89," which published 52 posts on both X and Instagram. It is a relatively new account, and transparency data indicates that it is active from Iraq.


Following that was the account "المقاوم eali_khaminiiy," (the resistor) which published 41 posts that included the hashtag #مع_إيران_حتى_النصر (With Iran Until Victory), but did not use the hashtag #ايران_السند_الحقيقي (Iran is the Solid Support). This account, which is active on Instagram, focuses on highlighting the role of the PMF and attacking American sites, according to its content. Transparency data also showed that it changed its name 13 times since its creation in 2021.

The list of interacting accounts also included Yemeni profiles, such as the account "Al-Yamaniya @Yemania33," which published 9 posts; a review of its content shows that it is pro-Houthi and focuses on supporting Iran.

In addition to the account "Abu Bahar @dwgan3," which published 5 posts focused on supporting Iran and also exhibits characteristics of inauthentic accounts, as it does not use a real name or photo and changed its name 11 times.

 

Common Characteristics of Participating Accounts

The accounts participating in both campaigns share several characteristics, including recent creation, the lack of real names or photos, and usernames containing random letters and numbers.

Repetitive or identical content was also observed being posted at short intervals, indicators often associated with inauthentic or coordinated accounts.

As for what are known as "Sockpuppet" accounts, these are accounts that appear real but are used to perform specific roles, such as promotion or influencing public discussions, especially in the context of conflicts or digital campaigns.