Few people are aware of the links between "Gen Z", an opposition campaign led by exiled Egyptian activist Anas Habib, and the "Midan Movement", a Turkey-based opposition group headed by Yahya Moussa, the former spokesperson for Egypt's Health Ministry during the rule of former president Mohamed Morsi. Moussa faces multiple terrorism-related accusations from the Egyptian government. Equally overlooked is the vast network of online accounts and platforms that help recycle political content and boost its spread across social media.

This report identifies a coordinated network of accounts that actively promotes content associated with the "Gen Z" movement and the "Midan Movement." The network also amplifies and recirculates clips and leaked materials that infringe on individuals' privacy, originally published by an account known as "Al Malek" ("The King").

The network's activity is driven by dozens of accounts, some of which display characteristics commonly associated with inauthentic or bot accounts including the use of fictitious identities. These accounts systematically engage with and re-share the same content, creating an interconnected amplification mechanism designed to expand its reach, increase visibility, and enhance its perceived prominence across digital platforms.

By tracking approximately 135 accounts and analyzing the relationships among them, this report maps the connections linking accounts associated with Anas Habib and Yahya Moussa, as well as the platforms that support and amplify their content. The analysis reveals how political amplification campaigns intersect with the dissemination of leaked materials and privacy-infringing content within a single digital ecosystem. It further demonstrates how this network operates through a recurring pattern of mutual promotion, coordinated engagement, and content recirculation designed to maximize reach and visibility.

How did it all begin?

On May 21, the account @nasrkarib139361 commented on a post published by @AlMalek0710, an account known for sharing leaked videos and other content that infringes on the privacy of public figures. The comment specifically requested the re-publication of a video clip showing protesters chanting, "Sisi must go."

However, a review of the clip revealed that it is an old video dating back to demonstrations in Cairo in 2019, not a recent clip as the context of the post suggested.

The account that re-shared the clip is a recent one, created in 2026, and uses a fake name and profile picture. Its transparency data also shows that it operates from Algeria. Although it appeared in January 2026, its activity is focused on interacting with old posts from the Al-Malek’s account, in addition to content published by a platform called "Sada Masr."

A review of "Sada Masr" content shows that it promotes the activities of the "Midan Movement," an opposition entity active in Istanbul. The movement is led by Yahya Moussa, the former spokesperson for the Egyptian Ministry of Health during the tenure of former President Mohamed Morsi. Egyptian authorities accuse him of involvement in planning the assassination of Egyptian Public Prosecutor Hisham Barakat, and he has been placed on terrorism lists by both the Egyptian government and the U.S. Department of Treasury.

The account @nasrkarib139361 also promotes old posts by another account named "Anas Taha (@iAnanasMnBenha)". An examination of this account shows that it repeatedly shares leaked clips and privacy-infringing content published by the Al Malek.

Anas Taha manages a group titled "Gen Z Support Community." The group includes a large number of accounts that intensely re-share content from Al Malek, alongside accounts associated with the "Gen Z" movement led by Anas Habib. The group also includes commercial accounts, accounts that publish sexual content, and accounts promoting the "Tayyibat" nutrition regime, a controversial dietary program associated with the late physician Diaa El Awady, who was previously removed from the Egyptian Medical Syndicate.

Digital Amplification Unit

Anas Taha serves as the manager for the "Gen Z Support Community" group, which comprises 727 members. This investigation monitors roughly 135 of these accounts on X. Preliminary findings suggest that many were established specifically to circulate content linked to Anas Habib and to amplify leaked materials from the "Al Malek" account.

By tracking a number of keywords and hashtags launched by Anas Habib’s account and re-promoted by accounts belonging to the "Gen Z Support Community," some features of the group's activity and its associated network of accounts became clear. Within one month, these accounts published content including hashtags such as:

#GenZ002

#الملك_حضر (The King has Arrived)

 #فوضناك_ياملك (We Authorize The King)

#عزل_السيسي (Ousting Sisi)

#السيسي_ضلمها (Sisi Brought it Down)

The number of posts containing these hashtags reached only about 1,200, yet they achieved an estimated reach of about 235 million impressions, alongside nearly 3 million interactions. These are high figures compared to the volume of published content, which may indicate large-scale amplification.

The graph of the number of posts and reach rates also showed that activity was not uniform but appeared in the form of successive "pulses." A limited group of accounts publishes content at close intervals, then the posts receive waves of interaction and re-sharing before the activity gradually declines, only to begin a new cycle with other content.

This pattern indicates the existence of inauthentic accounts (electronic flies) that perform the role of central broadcast nodes, publishing content first, while other accounts re-share and interact with it, contributing to expanding its scope of spread. This was shown by the network analysis conducted to track the relationships between the accounts within the "Gen Z Support Community" group.

Before moving to the results of the network analysis, monitoring data showed that the largest percentage of posts appeared on Facebook at about 34%, followed by X at 32%, then Instagram and TikTok at 19% and 9.2%, respectively.

Although Facebook led in terms of the number of posts, the number of active accounts was larger on X, while Facebook came in second place, followed by Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube.

As for the most present hashtags in the monitored content, it was #GenZ002, associated with the "Gen Z" group, followed by #احنا_الشعب (We are the People) and then #300_حملة

The data shows that these hashtags were promoted by accounts associated with the "Gen Z Support" group and Anas Habib, in addition to other accounts associated with the "Midan" movement led by Yahya Moussa.

Inauthentic accounts lead the activity

Analyses showed that the most active and publishing accounts were inauthentic accounts that impersonated opposition to the Egyptian regime. These accounts were led by an account on Facebook called: "Rawai3 Khawatir - Hotfeed."

An examination of the "Rawai3 Khawatir" account showed that it is an inauthentic account that uses a photo of the Syrian journalist Rola Ibrahim. It also densely publishes content related to Egyptian affairs, by pumping a large number of posts that include hashtags promoted by opposition accounts associated with the "Gen Z" group and the account of Anas Habib.

The account specified its location as London, after changing its declared location several times between Honduras, Dubai, Gaza, Brussels, and Geneva, before finally settling in London.

However, the account's transparency data showed that it is managed by three people, all of whom operate from Morocco.

Following it in the list of the most active accounts were the "Sada Masr" accounts on Instagram and X. The platform is closely linked to the "Midan Movement" active from Turkey, as the platform repeatedly promotes content belonging to members of the movement's political bureau, including Yahya Moussa, Mohamed Elhamy, and Reda Fahmy.

كما ظهر ضمن الحسابات الأكثر نشراً حساب آخر يحمل اسم "@ibnmasr_2011"، ويُعد هذا الحساب حديثاً نسبياً، إذ أُنشئ عام 2024، ولا يستخدم اسماً حقيقياً أو صورة شخصية. ورغم تحديده موقعه في تايلاند، أظهرت بيانات الشفافية أنه ينشط من منطقة غرب آسيا.

In addition to promoting the same hashtags promoted by the "Sada Masr" platform and the Anas Habib account, it was found that the account is a member of the "Gen Z Support Community" group, which led us to examine this group and map the network of interconnections between its accounts.

Inside the Gen Z support community 

By examining 135 accounts, most of which belong to the "Gen Z Support Community" group, and tracking 375 relationships between these accounts, we mapped the network analysis that highlights the nature of the group's activity.

The network analysis showed that the group operates in a way similar to inauthentic account networks (electronic flies) used in amplifying coordinated digital campaigns. The network consists of central accounts that take on the task of publishing content, and then another group of accounts re-shares and interacts with it to increase its spread.

This pattern applies to Al Malek, which is known for publishing leaks that violate personal privacy. The account publishes clips and posts, and then a group of accounts takes on the task of re-sharing them and amplifying their reach.

Although most of the accounts included in the analysis belonged to the "Gen Z Support Community" group, the statistical analysis of the network suggested dividing it into six main groups, led by the group associated with Anas Habib, which was linked to about 20% of the network's nodes.

Other accounts played the role of intermediary in passing content within the network by re-sharing "Anas Habib's" content, most notably the "Veteran_Politc" account. This is a recent account operating from Turkey, promoting the content of "Anas Habib" and Al Malek’s leaks, and also repeatedly promoting Yahya Moussa, leader of the "Midan Movement."

Anas Habib's posts were promoted by other inauthentic accounts, including accounts that publish sexual content such as @Hatem_23. This is a recent account that interacted repeatedly with @GenZ002_eg, one of the central accounts in the "Gen Z Support" community, in addition to "Veteran_Politc" and "Anas Taha", but the account publishes explicit sexual clips and images.

The group centered around the "Anas Habib" account was integrated into the broader network, specifically connecting to its second-largest component: the "Egyptian Revolutionary Council" group. This linkage was facilitated by several accounts, with "Omar Talaat" serving as a primary point of connection between the two entities.

Omar Talaat describes himself as a "member of the political bureau of the Midan Movement," which also includes Yahya Moussa, Mohamed Elhamy, and Reda Fahmy. The network analysis showed the existence of close links between the Midan Movement and its members on one hand, and the accounts of Gen Z, Anas Habib, and Al Malek on the other hand.

The "Egyptian Revolutionary Council" account is also linked to accounts that publish content related to the Midan Movement, while several inauthentic accounts re-share this content and interact with it. Among the most prominent of these accounts is the "@HH8317316758910 HH" account, to which the indicators of inauthentic accounts apply; it does not use a real name or personal photo, and its username consists of random letters and numbers.

This account serves as a critical bridge, linking the "Gen Z Support Community" with a separate cluster of digital profiles. In addition to facilitating these connections, it re-circulates content concerning the late physician Diaa El-Awady and aids in the promotion of his "Tayyibat System."

The rest of the accounts within the network are distributed among three other groups, one of which is linked to the account of Mohamed Elhamy, a member of the Midan Movement. Inauthentic accounts within this group re-share his articles and video clips, and all of them belong to the "Gen Z Support Community" group managed by Anas Taha.

The Anas Taha account does not differ from the general pattern of the rest of the accounts under study; it is a recent account operating from Turkey and does not use a real name or personal photo. It also participated in promoting leaks published by Al Malek, and is closely linked to the Anas Habib account, in addition to its promotion of the content of Yahya Moussa and the Midan Movement.

The results of the analysis indicate that the tracked network is closely linked to accounts and content belonging to the Midan Movement, which appeared as one of the most prominent central actors within the observed network relationships. The results also showed the existence of a large number of inauthentic accounts that take on the task of re-sharing content related to "Gen Z," Anas Habib, and Al Malek account, through a pattern that relies on mutual recycling and amplification of content.

This operational model embodies the "closed loop" phenomenon seen in coordinated digital operations, where accounts reciprocally promote identical material to broaden its reach. Beyond political messaging, the investigation found that some network-linked accounts overlap with distinct online circles, such as those distributing sexual content or endorsing the "Tayyibat System". These intersections introduce a level of intricacy that surpasses many conventional amplification networks.